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CRIMINAL LAw-REsENTENCE-RIGHT TO CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED
UNDER Vom SENTENCE-Plaintiffs in error were convicted and sentenced
from one to twenty years with recommendations that they serve four to five
years. On writ of error, the judgment in each case was reversed and the cause
was remanded for entry of a proper sentence· because the statute under which
sentence was imposed was unconstitutional. A new sentence of from one to
twenty years was imposed in each case. Plaintiffs in error had served three and
one-half years in the one case, and over four ,years in the other case, under the
original sentence. Error is assigned because no credit was allowed in the new
sentence for time served in prison under the original invalid sentences. Held,
on resentence the court is not required to give credit for time served in prison
under. a void sentence. The court may, however, in its discretion, give credit
· for time served by shortening the maximum under the new sentence. People v.
Starks, (Ill. 1947) 71 N.E. (2d) 23; People v. Judd, (Ill. 1947) 71 N.E.

(2d) 29.
It is well settled that.where a criminal sentence is imposed and is later determined to be erroneous~ or void, the court may set the sentence aside and pronounce a valid sentence.1 This is true even though there has been partial execution of the original sentence. 2 And, in such a case, the new sentence may increase the punishment b~yond that provided in the first sentence.8 The action of

1 Tinkoff v. United States, (C.C.A. -7th, 1937) 86 F. (2d) 868, cert. den., 301
U.S. 689, 57 S. Ct. 795 (1937); Commonwealth v: Murphy, 174 Mass. 369, 54 N.E.
860 (1899), 48 L.R.A. 393 (1900), affd., 177 U.S. 155, 20 S. Ct. 639 (1900);
State v. Mehlhorn, 195 Wash. 690, 82 P. (2d) 158 (1938); Nelson v. Foley, 54 S.D.
382, 223 N.W. 323 (1929); King v. United States, 69 App. D.C. IO, 98 F. (2d) 291
(1938).
2 qises cited, supra, note I.
3 King v. United States, 69 App. D.C. IO, 98 F. (2d) 291 (1938); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 174 Mass. 369, 54 N.E. 860 (1899), affd., 177 U.S. 155, 20
S. Ct. 639 (1900). In Robinson v. U!Jited States, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 144 F. (2d)
392, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for kidnapping. On his writ of
error the case was reversed and the new trial and sentence resulted in imposition of the
death penalty. See, also, Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 40 S. Ct. 50 (1919),
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the court in resentencing one lawfully convicted of a crime does not constitute a
double jeopardy.4 The new sentence having been pronounced at the instance of
the defendant, he is deemed to have waived any constitutional objection he
might have had. 6 Subject to two restrictions there is no general agreement as
to whether the court must allow credit for the time served under an invalid
sentence. Where the time served· under the original sentence equals or exceeds
the legal maximum for the offense, the cases agree that the prisoner should be
discharged. 6 And, where less time has been served, it has been held that under
certain situations the court may not ignore the time served under the invalid
sentence. Where the new sentence imposes a definite period of confinement,
the total time which must be served under the new sentence plus the previous
confinement may not exceed the maximum legal penalty. 1 This is also true
where the new sentence is for an indefinite period of confinement, but as a practical matter this consideration seems to present no difficulty here, because seldom
is the maximum time under the indefinite sentence actually served. The time
allowed on the new sentence for good behavior generally offsets the time previously served, so that there is little likelihood that the total time the prisoner
will actually serve will be more than the maximum provided by law. Where
the case is not subject to the aforementioned restrictions, there is more or less
general agreement that the court may consider the previous imprisonment and
allow credit for this time in imposing the new sentence. 8 In point of fact, such
credit is more often allowed than not. But the cases are in conflict as to
whether allowing such credit is mandatory. In this connection, a distinction is
sometimes made between sentences which are merely erroneous and those
which ~re absolutely void. 9 Where the original sentence is merely erroneous,
where the death penalty was similarly substituted for the invalid sentence of life imprisonment.
4 Bryant v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 214 F. (2d) 51; Robinson v.
United States, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 392; King v. United States, 69 App.
D.C. 19, 98 F. (2d) 291 (1938); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 174 Mass. 369, 54
N.E. 860 (1899), affd., 177 U.S. 155, 20 S. Ct. 639 (1900).
5 A further reason given for this holding is that a convicted person cannot by his
own act avoid the jeopardy in which he stands, then assert it as a bar so as to escape
fulfilling the punishment for his crime. Furthermore, it is considered that a person is
not placed in jeopardy by an unlawful or void sentence. See cases supra, note 4.
6 Bennett v. Hollowell, 203 Iowa 352, 212 N.W. 701 (1927); People v. Huber,
389 III. 192, 58 N.E. (2d) 879 (1945); Ex parte Bulger, 60 Cal. 438 (1882).
1 In In re Leypoldt, 32 Cal App. (2d) 518, 90 P. (2d) 91 (1939), three and
one half months had been served under a void sentence which was set aside, and defendant was resentenced to three months. The maximum imprisonment for the offense
was six months. Held, resentence void as to excess over six months including the
time previously served. See, also, Koslowski v. Board of Trustees of Newcastle County
Workhouse, (Del. Super. 1921) II8 A. 596; Debenque v. United States, 66 App.
D.C. 36, 85 F. (2d) 202 (1936); King v. United States, 69 App. D.C. 10, 98 F.
(2d) 291 (1938).
•
8 Although the Illinois court does not require· that credit be given, it is recognized that such credit "may'' be given. People v. Wilson, 391 III. 463, 63 N.E. (2d)
488 (1945), allowed such credit by reducing the maximum time to be served under
the new sentence. See, also, In re Wilson, 202 Cal. 341, 260 P. 542 (1927), and
15 AM. JuR., Criminal Law, § 477.
'
9 Ex parte Gunter, 193 Ala. 486, 69 S. 442 (1915); In re Wilson, 202 Cal.
341, 260 P. 542 (1927); and see 9 A.L.R, 958 (1920).
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as, for example, error in the place of confineµient, a majority of the cases allow
credit for time served thereunder, and such credit is frequently required.10 If the
original sentence is entirely void, however, as where it is imposed under an
unconstitutional statute, there is considerable authority that the court is not required to give credit for time served.11 The reason for not requiring credit is
that a void sentence is in law considered no sentence at all, and the case is the
same as though no sentence had yet been pronounced on a defendant who has
been properly convicted. The defendant, therefore, has not served any part of
the valid_ sentence. Clearly, such a result may frequently impose genuine hardship and substantially lengthen the time of imprisonment. For this very reason
some courts have required that the new sentence allow credit for time served
under the sentence set aside, and failure to allow such credit is reversible
error.12
Bruce L. Moore

10 A sentence, though erroneous, is still of legal significance, and time served
thereunder should not be ignored. Owen v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 394, 283 S.W.
400 (1926); In re Silva, 38 Cal. App. 98, 175 P. 481 (~918); State v. Fairchild,
136 Wash. 132, 238 P. 922 (1925); and 9 A.L.R. 958 (1920).
11 Ex parte Gunter, 193 Ala. 486, 69 S. 442 (1915); McCormick v. State,
71 Neb. 505, 99 N.W. 237 (1904); Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 219, 63 S.W.
1009 (1901); Ex parte Wilson, 202 Cal. 341, 260 P. 542 (1927). Such cases are
criticized in 9 A.L.R. 958 (1920)-as being more consistent with dry logic than with
natural justice. There is no rel}uirement that credit be allowed where sentence is
imposed under federal law. See Debenque v. United States, 66 App. D.C. 36, 85 F.
(2d) 202 (1936); King v. United States, 69 App. D.C. 10, 98 F. (2d) 291 (1938).
12 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 760, 220 S.W. 1045 (1920); State v.
Mehlhorne, 195 Wash. 690, 82 P. {2d) 158 (1938). Some courts require that
credit be given without distinguishing between erroneous and void sentences. In
re Silva, 38 Colo. App. 98, 175 P. 481 (1918); Jackson v. Commonwealth, ibid.
Of course, ailowance of credit may be required by statute. See People ex rel. Barrett
v. Hunt, (N.Y. S. Ct. 1939) 12 N.Y.S. (2d) 127; In re Cowan, 284 Mich. 343,
279 N.Y. 854 (1938).

